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Abstract
Following the Great Recession, employment in the U.S. local education sector fell by about
364,000. I analyze whether state legislation that prohibits or limits the use of seniority in layo↵
decisions has an impact on public high school graduation rates. I find that over a ten-year time
span, all else held constant, such legislation on average increases the yearly growth of district
graduation rates by about 0.3 percentage points. This is economically significant, as the average
yearly increase in the national graduation rate from 2010-11 to 2015-16 was 1 percentage point.
When states prohibit or limit using seniority to determine a layo↵ order, districts must utilize
other considerations such as teacher quality. In states with this legislation, teachers remaining
following layo↵s are likely more e↵ective as opposed to ones in states that used seniority to
determine the layo↵ order.
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Highlights:
• Following the Great Recession, school districts faced massive teacher layo↵s.
• Many states passed legislation restricting the use of seniority in teacher layo↵s.
• Such legislation may lead to a higher yearly gain in high school graduation rates.
• Results show an approximate 0.3 percentage point increase in yearly gains.
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1. Introduction
In 1955, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics began tracking the school-year average employment in
the local government education sector. Since then, the sector has consistently added jobs—with two
notable exceptions. During and following the 1980s recession, the sector lost approximately 140,000
jobs (about 2 percent of the workforce) between February 1981 and October 1983. Employment
levels recovered within a year. Then, during and following the Great Recession, the sector lost
364,000 jobs (about 4 percent of the workforce) between July 2008 and November 2012. In December
2018, six years after the 2012 low, only 218,000 jobs had been added back.1
The Great Recession caused a significant and lasting e↵ect on state budgets, constricting the
flow of state funding to public school districts. In regions particularly impacted by the recession,
families were forced to relocate, thus contributing to lower enrollment levels and further exacerbat-
ing funding problems. School districts across the United States now needed to lay o↵ substantial
numbers of personnel, including teachers, in order to address financial and enrollment problems.
However, perhaps in part due to the relatively short history of teacher layo↵s, many states and
school districts were ill prepared to determine which teachers would be subject to termination.
The focus of this paper is how a policy regarding teacher layo↵ order a↵ects students. Di↵erent
policies a↵ect the quality distribution of teachers, and higher-quality teachers contribute to im-
proved student outcomes (Goldhaber and Theobald, 2010; Chetty et al., 2014). As several states
since 2009 have enacted legislation prohibiting or restricting the use of seniority in teacher layo↵
decisions, I seek to capture the e↵ect of this layo↵ legislation on high school graduation rates. My
hypothesis is that legislation prohibiting or restricting the use of seniority as a predominant factor
in determining the layo↵ order of teaching positions has a positive impact on graduation rates.
Using data spanning school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, I find that the enactment of such
legislation increases the yearly growth of district graduation rates by about 0.3 percentage points
on average, all else held constant. This is economically significant, as the average yearly increase in
the national graduation rate for public high school students from 2010-11 to 2015-16 was about 1
percentage point. If the yearly growth of overall U.S. graduation rates were 0.3 percentage points
higher in the five years between 2011-12 and 2015-16, it would have resulted in nearly 174,000
1Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on local government education sector employment.
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additional graduates. Also, the estimate of 0.3 is within range of what Bekkerman and Gilpin
(2011) find from a $1,000 per-teacher investment in improving teacher quality via o↵ering higher
wages (0.2 to 1.1 percentage point increase in the graduation rate).2
A higher year-to-year growth rate due to restrictions on using seniority in layo↵ decisions can also
increase the social welfare, as high school graduates have better access to jobs with higher wages
and postsecondary education. These results suggest that, absent using seniority to determine a
layo↵ order, considerations such as teacher quality may play a larger role. The teachers remaining
following layo↵s not based solely on seniority may be more e↵ective and therefore their schools
would experience higher graduation rates, as opposed to schools that used seniority to determine
the layo↵ order.
This paper provides a background on recent activity concerning teacher layo↵ policies in Section
2. The data is described in Section 3. In Section 4, I present a model for analyzing the impact of
state policy on graduation rates. Following in Section 5 are results, and in Section 6 are robust-
ness checks. Section 7 concludes and notes general concerns regarding using teacher e↵ectiveness
measures as presented in current literature.
2. Background
Prior to 2009, the majority of states did not mandate the manner in which school districts could
determine personnel subject to dismissal in the event of a layo↵, permitting districts to decide.
Of states that did, most maintained laws requiring school districts to lay o↵ teachers in the order
of reverse seniority (perhaps even irrespective of considerations such as high-demand certification
areas,3 or whether schools serving higher poverty populations would be more severely a↵ected).
Then, with the Great Recession, these policies gained national attention as school districts
across the country faced mass layo↵s of teachers. States were dealing with constricted budgets,
narrowing state funding flowing to districts. Contrary to the status quo, state legislatures began
considering and passing laws aimed at reducing the weight of seniority on layo↵ decisions. Some
laws specified factors to be considered before seniority (such as performance or certification area),
2The range of these results are for sample schools within di↵erent graduation rate quantiles, up to the 60th
quartile. The authors also provide results for the 80th quartile, though that estimate is not statistically significant.
3Districts required to layo↵ by seniority without considering high-demand certification areas would need to im-
mediately recall such teachers to fill these areas. This ine cient process would require the number of sta↵ subject to
layo↵ to be unnecessarily larger, as the district would be laying o↵ sta↵ that it knew would be recalled.
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some required multiple factors to be considered simultaneously, and others prohibited the use of
seniority at all. While all such legislation activity aimed to weaken seniority protections, not all
proposed bills have passed. In several states, it remains a debated, unresolved issue. No broad
consensus has been reached to address exactly how to determine sta↵ subject to layo↵.
In addition to the pressures caused by the Great Recession, there was a nationwide push for
the retention of quality teachers. Both are likely forces for this attention on layo↵ procedures.
The focus on quality teachers, as measured by student performance or other metrics aside from
seniority, was at least in part influenced by the priorities of the Obama administration. New federal
grants were awarded to states on the basis of their e↵orts to consider student outcomes for teacher
evaluations (and, consequently, sta ng decisions). This created an incentive for states to maintain
or change legislation to match the grants’ priorities.
The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the local education sector includes teaching po-
sitions as well as non-instructional positions such as central o ce and maintenance sta↵. Data
tracking specific to teacher employment began in 2010. Between 2010 and 2018, 449,000 elemen-
tary, middle, and secondary teacher jobs were added (see Figure 1). However, secondary teaching
positions alone dropped by 159,000. Combined with the overall local education sector layo↵s and
reduced employment levels continuing well beyond the recession years, there is evidence for teacher
layo↵s occurring at significant levels even through 2017. In particular, layo↵s are occurring even
after state policy changes came into e↵ect (which for the time period analyzed in this paper was
as early as 2009-10 and as late as 2015-16).
Fig. 1. Teacher employment.
Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population
Survey.
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Supporters of prohibiting or limiting the use of seniority in layo↵ decisions argue that higher-
quality teachers should not be laid o↵ before lower-quality teachers just because they have fewer
years of service to the district. The main assumption here, as Chetty et al. (2014) find, is that
higher-quality teachers have higher average impacts on students’ test scores and future labor market
outcomes. A second important assumption is that the quality distribution of teachers remaining
is in fact di↵erent under two alternate policies favoring or limiting seniority as the deciding factor.
This assumption is supported by research on Washington state school district layo↵s during 2008 to
2010 from Goldhaber and Theobald (2010). They find little overlap in the teachers remaining using
a simulation of layo↵ by value-added measures (VAM), a measurement of teachers’ contributions
to their students’ performance, versus by seniority. Using student achievement to quantify teacher
quality, they find that the mean quality of teacher actually laid o↵ (by seniority) was 5-6% of a
standard deviation lower than that of all teachers. While this does suggest experience contributes
to higher-quality teachers, Goldhaber and Theobald (2010) add that when they simulated the
layo↵ by e↵ectiveness measures, the mean quality of teacher laid o↵ was then 24-26% of a standard
deviation lower than that of all teachers.
Therefore, the distribution of teacher quality, as defined by e↵ectiveness or ability to positively
impact student outcomes, is expected to be di↵erent under the two layo↵ policies. In addition,
teacher quality of those remaining may be significantly higher when e↵ectiveness measures are used
than when only seniority is used. My results suggest that the distribution of quality teachers is
not just immediately or temporarily altered by such policies, but also that restricting seniority
consideration persistently and positively a↵ects student graduation rates.
One argument against limiting seniority protections involves school districts’ financial concerns.
School districts implement layo↵s as part of a response to declining enrollment and/or major
financial problems. Therefore, it is natural for teachers and advocates to fight for protections against
a district simply laying o↵ its most expensive (and likely most senior) personnel. In addition, the
impact of turnover would be lower since fewer positions would have to be closed in order to achieve
a cost reduction. Advocates of seniority protections also argue that a routine evaluation system
should be su cient to remove truly unsatisfactory employees. Yet findings from Goldhaber and
Theobald (2010), as previously discussed, suggest otherwise.
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3. Data
3.1 Graduation Rates
Graduation rates, between 0 and 100, are a measure of the number of graduates per 100 high school
students. In this paper, the outcome variable is the change in the graduation rate from the prior
year. This data is obtained from the US Department of Education’s National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) for the school years 2006-07 through 2015-16. However, the data for school years
2006-07 to 2009-10 are calculated di↵erently than for years 2010-11 to 2015-16. During the first
set, the NCES did not regulate the methodology for calculating the graduation rate. Since 2010-11,
NCES regulates this calculation (such as using a uniform definition of cohort or degree type) but
there still may be measurement di↵erences. Data reported in each set is insu cient for generating
graduation rates that can be compared between the two sets. In order to address this problem,
all analysis performed excludes the change in graduation rate between the two years in which the
formula was also changed (2009-10 to 2010-11).
As suggested by Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) and Murnane (2013), these particular sets of
graduation data can each be unreliable for analysis. They argue that the calculation of graduation
rates does not ensure uniform treatment of problems with student accounting and variation in
degree types. It is di cult to assign a definition of the cohort basis, without introducing potential
for error, to compare to the number of graduates. (For example, NCES makes adjustments to
account for eighth-grade dropouts or net student migration immediately prior to ninth grade, but
would still be imperfect.) Also, it is di cult to account for varying degree types o↵ered (GEDs,
diplomas, or other options). I hope to mitigate concerns with this data, as my analysis does not
attempt to compare absolute graduation rates between school districts. I only utilize the di↵erence
in a district’s graduation rate from one year to the next. As long as district reporting is internally
consistent, concerns Heckman and LaFontaine (2010) and Murnane (2013) raised should not a↵ect
these results.
Shown in Table 1 is the initial number of observations (regular school districts), the numbers
meeting specified criteria for exclusion, and the resulting number of observations that is utilized
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in analysis.4,5 Also displayed is the mean change in graduation rate for the resulting data. First
excluded are district-level cohort sizes of less than or equal to 100. Cohort size is the number
of graduates a district would expect to have with a 100% graduation rate. These are already
omitted from later years due to increased privacy restrictions, and in any case the status of a single
student can cause significant fluctuations in the overall graduate rate. The second group excluded
is districts with standard deviations (of the change in graduation rate) greater than or equal to 30
percentage points; these appeared to clearly contain an error. For example, one district reports
over 90% graduation rate in all ten years except one, in which it reports 0.9%. The last exclusion is
of districts that in any year indicate charter schools were part of reported data, since not all charter
schools are required to follow state mandates on traditional public schools. These exclusions do
not substantially impact results, however.6
Table 1: Number of observations (public school districts) per year.
School Year Initial Exclusion Resulting Mean Change
Comparison No. of Obs. Small Cohort Large Std. Dev. Has Charters No. of Obs. in Grad Rate
2006-07 to 2007-08 9504 4020 364 738 4822 0.39
2007-08 to 2008-09 9177 3970 214 567 4726 0.60
2008-09 to 2009-10 9222 4034 309 573 4656 1.34
2009-10 to 2010-11 0 0 0 0 0 -
2010-11 to 2011-12 3272 0 26 503 2745 1.17
2011-12 to 2012-13 3223 0 18 497 2709 0.80
2012-13 to 2013-14 3262 0 20 496 2747 0.73
2013-14 to 2014-15 3232 0 20 502 2711 0.85
2014-15 to 2015-16 3225 0 26 500 2701 0.58
44117 12024 997 4376 27817 0.80
Notes: Data for 2009-10 to 2010-11 is excluded due to the NCES change in graduation rate calcu-
lation methodology. The significant decline in school district observations before and after 2010-11
is likely due to increased privacy restrictions, with data for smaller schools omitted from the latter
sets. I also exclude when: district-level cohort sizes are less than or equal to 100, standard deviations
(of the change in graduation rate) are greater than or equal to 30 percentage points, and/or charter
schools are as part of the district in any year.
4Already excluded in initial observations is the change in graduation rate between the two years in which the
formula was also changed, as well as Alabama and New York City school district data. Alabama data has been
declared misstated. New York City school district data is reported only at a finer geographic level while other sources
for their control variable data are not. Within this time period, one to three years of data for some states is omitted
by NCES. NCES documentation states this is due to granting waivers for submission or when states missed the
deadline for publication. In some years, NCES does not provide exact graduation rates in the 99 to 100 range for
even large populations. So for 262 observations, I assign the rate to the low end of 99 (though it hardly makes a
di↵erence if the high end of 100 is used instead).
5The NCES definition of regular schools is “a public elementary/secondary school providing instruction and
education services that does not focus primarily on special education, career/technical education, or alternative
education, or on any of the particular themes associated with magnet/special program-emphasis schools.”
6See Table 6 in Section 6.1.
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3.2 Policy Indicator
The data on the policy this paper seeks to evaluate, the policy of prohibiting or restricting the use
of seniority in determining layo↵ orders, is generated from my research on each state’s legislative
history.7 I construct the policy as a time-variant binary variable for each district and school year
combination: state-mandated prohibited or restricted use of seniority in determining layo↵ orders
in a given year (indicator equals 1), or otherwise (indicator equals 0).
Where state legislation has specified the role of seniority, it does not vary across its districts.
Where no explicit policy is in place (or the state explicitly permits district flexibility), practices
may vary district to district. When school districts are permitted discretion, they may vary in the
degree to which they consider seniority. In analyzing a North Carolina district implementing a
large layo↵, Kraft (2015) finds that, while no VAM model was explicitly used, there was significant
emphasis on teacher attributes (such as principal evaluations) in the determination of layo↵ order.
However, districts in general may or may not adopt strong seniority considerations when given the
discretion.
Over the ten years analyzed, 28 states and the District of Columbia never implement a state
policy significantly restricting the use of seniority in teacher layo↵ decisions. Two states have such
a policy in force during the entire ten-year period (via legislation enacted prior to the time window
analyzed). The remaining 20 states did not have this policy in e↵ect as of 2006-07 but enacted
legislation at some point over the ten-year period (e↵ective as early as the 2008-09 school year and as
late as the 2015-16 school year). Due to data exclusions as described in section 3.1, no observations
remain for Alabama, D.C., Hawaii, and Vermont (which never implemented such policy), as well
as New Hampshire (which did). Presented in Table 2 are descriptive statistics for the change in
graduation rates, without and with policy implementation for each state as applicable.
7The National Center on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) also produces a State Policy Yearbook Database every two
years beginning with 2011, which was very helpful in guiding my research.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of change in graduation rates, by state and policy.
Seniority Not Restricted Seniority Restricted
(policy=0) (policy=1)
Change in Graduation Rate Change in Graduation Rate
State N Mean SD N Mean SD
Alabama
Alaska 28 2.5 10.8
Arizona 76 1.0 9.8 195 0.6 4.3
Arkansas 367 -0.5 6.9
California 769 1.2 4.7
Colorado 83 0.2 7.1 21 2.2 5.6
Connecticut 532 0.7 4.0
Delaware 129 1.3 4.9
D.C.
Florida 45 0.1 5.2 44 2.4 5.8
Georgia 441 2.4 5.8 278 2.6 5.4
Hawaii
Idaho 95 1.0 7.2 26 0.2 3.6
Illinois 409 0.0 6.4 620 0.6 3.7
Indiana 670 0.8 6.4 482 0.7 3.3
Iowa 416 0.4 5.7
Kansas 280 1.1 5.5
Kentucky 551 0.7 5.3
Louisiana 204 0.6 6.1 155 1.8 4.0
Maine 38 1.1 4.7 57 0.9 4.0
Maryland 120 0.7 3.0
Massachusetts 959 0.4 4.2
Michigan 1066 -0.5 7.1 869 0.9 4.0
Minnesota 769 0.6 5.1
Mississippi 589 0.6 6.6
Missouri 842 1.0 5.3
Montana 50 0.7 4.1
Nebraska 185 0.4 5.2
Nevada 25 0.7 5.5
New Hampshire
New Jersey 1537 0.8 4.5
New Mexico 116 1.4 5.8
New York 1962 1.1 4.7
North Carolina 766 2.0 4.2
North Dakota 71 1.9 5.1
Ohio 1281 0.5 6.4 829 0.4 3.2
Oklahoma 289 0.1 7.6 91 -0.7 4.1
Oregon 157 0.9 7.1
Pennsylvania 2201 0.2 5.1
Rhode Island 50 -2.1 6.5 102 1.4 3.8
South Carolina 218 1.7 4.1
South Dakota 79 -0.4 6.7
Tennessee 297 2.4 6.3 348 0.8 3.3
Texas 2352 1.2 5.1
Utah 95 0.0 6.0 124 1.6 3.4
Vermont
Virginia 477 1.5 5.1 217 1.0 3.2
Washington 763 1.0 6.2 85 1.3 3.4
West Virginia 315 1.1 4.2
Wisconsin 237 0.6 5.3 195 0.3 2.6
Wyoming 78 0.6 6.1
19860 0.7 5.4 7957 1.0 4.3
Notes: States with policies restricting the use of seniority in teacher layo↵s a particular year are
listed as “seniority restricted.” Data spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16. See section 3.1
for detail on data exclusions.
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With a na¨ıve look at the data on graduation rates and policy implementation, Figure 2 below
is consistent with my hypothesis that state policy restricting seniority as a factor in layo↵ decisions
positively impacts public high school graduation rates. On the vertical axis is the time-averaged
yearly change in graduation rates. For states that have no policy change (in other words, states
that always or never implement this policy during the time period), I calculate one time-averaged
value. For the group of states implementing policy during the time period, I separately average
data prior to (left-hand plot point) and after (right-hand plot point) implementation.
The figure shows that, among states implementing policy between 2006-07 and 2015-16, the
time-average before implementation is below all others but after implementation is higher than
states that never implement policy. There are few states in the always-implemented group, but
their time-average rate is also the highest.
Fig. 2. Average yearly change in graduation rate per group of states.
Notes: The time period spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16. The change in graduation rate is
calculated as the di↵erence between a district’s rate and its prior-year rate. For the states that experienced
no policy change regarding the restriction of seniority as a factor in teacher layo↵s, rates are averaged over
time and per group of states. For the states that experienced policy implementation during this time period,
rates prior to implementation and post-implementation are separately averaged. Due to data exclusions as
noted in section 3.1, no observations remained for 4 states as well as D.C.
3.3 Control Variables
I utilize panel data on several district-level control variables. Some factors describe the makeup of
the student population: the percentage of children aged 5-17 in poverty within district boundaries
(as a proxy for student poverty), the percentage of students requiring special education services,
and the percentage of students who are English language learners (ELL). I also include figures on
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the cohort size, total district membership, and an indicator of the district’s urbanicity level.8 A
final district-level variable is the fiscal surplus per 1,000 students, adjusted to real 2018 dollars, as
a measure of financial health. The percentage of children in poverty per school district boundary is
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates. All others are obtained
from the U.S. National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
Additionally, I use indicator variables that describe political party power at the state level. For
each of governorship, state senate, and state house, I constructed panel data that indicates which
party is in power for each state-year combination. Possible values assigned for party control are:
Democrat, Republican, Tie (for state senates and/or houses) and Independent (for governorships),
as applicable. This data is derived from the National Conference of State Legislatures.9 I assign
political party power forward in time. For example, if the partisanship of the state governor changes
with the 2008 election, I align it with 2009-10 school-year data.10
An important note about the district-level dynamic factors is that they vary little over time (see
Table 3). The following hardly vary: student population percentages (poverty, special education,
ELL) and fiscal surplus per 1,000 students. Cohort size, district size, and urbanicity indicators vary
somewhat more. Urbanicity levels (not displayed below) for 75% of districts have a max-min range
of 1 or fewer steps on a 12-step scale, but at the 95th percentile, have a range of up to 6 steps.
Table 3: Standard deviations of district-level data.
Variable N 75th Percentile 95th Percentile
% Poverty 27621 3 pct. pts. 5 pct. pts.
% Special Education 27692 1 pct. pt. 2 pct. pts.
% ELL 27681 1 pct. pt. 3 pct. pts.
Surplus per 1,000 students 27715 $2 $4
Cohort Size 27714 12% 20%
District Size 27715 6% 12%
Notes: Data spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, excluding data as noted in section 3.1.
Cohort Size and District Size standard deviations are divided by time-averaged values.
8NCES indicators of urbanicity are assigned on a non-linear 12-step scale, based upon local population levels
and/or distance from a larger urban area.
9I cross-referenced this with other sources such as Ballotpedia, and where I found discrepancies I investigated
further (referring to national and/or local news sites, for example) to confirm the accurate assignment. Nebraska
state legislature is o cially nonpartisan, but the legislators individually maintain an a liation with a major party.
Nebraska also has a unicameral system, so whichever party is in power in the legislature, I assign it as in power for
both the ”senate” and ”house” for my model.
10In this example, the transition a↵ects the 2009 legislative session. Legislation concerning public school districts
would then tend to be e↵ective the 2009-10 school year.
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These district-level descriptive statistics have notable implications for district-level fixed e↵ects
models. If these variables are treated as constant over time, a district-level fixed e↵ects model
will implicitly control for them. But treating variables with low within-variation as dynamic and
including them (the student population percentages and fiscal surplus in particular) in district-level
fixed-e↵ects models is likely to lead to results with low precision.
4. Empirical Framework
4.1 Statistical Model
The goal is to analyze the e↵ect of state policy on school district graduation rates for the ten-year
time period 2006-07 to 2015-16, controlling for related district and state attributes. I set up a
model with the change in graduation rates as the dependent variable, and so estimated parameters
describe the rate of change in graduation rates. The model, to be estimated with fixed e↵ects, is
as follows:
 gdt = ↵d +  policyst +  Xdt + "dt (1)
The dependent variable  gdt is the change in the graduation rate for district d from the prior
school year. Allowing for district-level fixed e↵ects, ad represents the fixed baseline year-over-year
increase per district. The variable policyst indicates the state policy on teacher layo↵s over time,
valued at 1 if the seniority consideration in teacher layo↵ decisions is restricted by state s in year t,
and 0 otherwise. The e↵ect of this policy is then measured by  . Finally, Xdt is the control vector
for attributes of district d in year t and   is the coe cient vector.11
The parameter of interest is  , the e↵ect of implementing a state policy prohibiting or restricting
the use of seniority in layo↵ decisions. My hypothesis is that the policy has a positive e↵ect on the
graduation rate and so predict that estimated   will be a positive value. In the absence of seniority
as the primary factor, alternative factors such as the quality of the teacher are used. As Chetty
et al. (2014) and Goldhaber and Theobald (2010) suggest that considering teacher quality would
lead to a higher-quality distribution of teachers and therefore improved student outcomes, I expect
11The control vector is denoted at the district level but some factors (such as political party power) will only vary
by state.
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that the e↵ect of the policy on teacher quality distribution is long-lasting and significant enough
to have a persistent e↵ect on the graduation rate.
Fig. 3. A graphical interpretation of model parameters.
Notes: Consider a district in a state that implements a policy restricting the use of seniority in
teacher layo↵ decisions beginning with the 2011-12 school year. The solid line represents its pre-
policy trend (shown for simplicity as a constant yearly increase; control variables add flexibility). It
has a year-over-year percentage point increase of ↵d in the graduation rate. The dotted line then
illustrates a steeper slope (↵d +  ) for a yearly additional  -percentage point attributed to policy
implementation.
Above, Figure 3 illustrates the interpretation of model parameters for a district in a state that
implements a policy restricting the use of seniority e↵ective 2011-12. On this graph of graduation
rates over time, the slope is the yearly change in graduation rates (the dependent variable in my
model). The solid line with initial slope ↵d describes the trend in absence of this policy through
2010-11, and afterward represents the assumed counterfactual of policy implementation. The dotted
line with a steeper slope (for   > 0) represents a change in the slope of graduation rate increases
after policy implementation in 2011-12.
4.2 Identification and Model Assumptions
For identification of the estimated e↵ect of the policy in question, the main concern is omitted
variable bias. So it is important to control for any variables that correlate with the outcome
(yearly change in graduation rate) and the variable of interest (policy). There are some factors
that impact both the graduation rate of districts within a state and whether the state enacted laws
limiting the weight on seniority. Generally, the political party with power at the state level will
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play a role in education policy and public school funding. More specifically, the motivation for
states to pass this type of legislation was derived from two events impacting all states: the Great
Recession, and the Obama administration initiatives concerned with teacher quality. Both events
a↵ected the funding available to school districts, but likely a↵ected them di↵erently based upon the
prior financial health of the district and its state. These policies potentially have greater impacts
on districts that are already struggling.
Therefore, I consider district-level and state-level factors that can disproportionately and sub-
stantially constrain a district’s budget as well as the growth in its graduation rate. Such factors
included are: the percentage of students requiring special education services, the percentage of
students who are English language learners (ELL), and the percentage of children aged 5-17 in
poverty within district boundaries (as a proxy for student poverty). I include the district surplus
(total revenue less total expenditures) per 1,000 students as a measure of the district’s general
financial health, as well as district membership totals, cohort size, and indicator variables for ur-
banicity. The sensitivity of school district finances and graduation rates could vary by district size
and population density. A large urban district, for example, may more easily connect with outside
sources of supplemental financial and/or student support.
By estimating the regression equation with district-level fixed e↵ects, any district-level time-
invariant factors related to policy implementation and the yearly change in graduation rate are
controlled for. The district-level variables I identified as important to consider actually vary little
over time (as discussed in section 3.3). It may be more appropriate, then, to treat them as static
variables already controlled for under district-level fixed e↵ects models—including them only when
considering a model with only state-level fixed e↵ects, for example. In any case, I provide for
comparison regression results with at least three variants for district-level fixed e↵ects models:
treating these variables as static (excluded), treating some as static (excluding those with lowest
variance over time), and treating all as dynamic (none excluded).
Finally, I include the political leaning or influence for each state. These variables indicate the
party in power for each of the governorship, state senate, and state house. State government can
play a large role in their school districts. Where political ideology di↵ers with regard to public
education, the party in power in state government may impact graduation rates di↵erently. While
I note the Great Recession and the teacher quality initiatives as motivators for states to alter their
Restricting Seniority as a Factor in Teacher Layo↵s 15
policy on teacher layo↵s, actual policy change requires action by the state legislators. Historically,
more Democratic politicians support teacher unions, which tend to oppose restrictions on seniority
protections. Therefore, one would expect a policy reducing the consideration of seniority in layo↵
decisions to be proposed and passed in states under Republican control. While there are in fact
notable instances to the contrary, this was generally the case.
A limitation of my analysis is that I do not directly account for actual layo↵s in the model. I
rely heavily on the fact that layo↵s were pervasive and substantial. However, perhaps not every
district laid o↵ teachers. Certainly, some districts had proportionally larger and/or more rounds
of layo↵s than others. This omission can lead to bias in the estimated e↵ect of state policy. If
some states had more districts severely impacted, maybe they were more likely to consider and
implement changes to their layo↵ policies. It is also reasonable that these districts saw slower
growth in graduation rates. Supposing then a positive correlation between the number of layo↵s
and the variable of interest (policy), as well as a negative coe cient on layo↵s if included in the
model, my estimated e↵ect of state policy may actually be biased downward. Investigating this
further could be a line of future research.
5. Results
Presented in the following subsections are results assuming district-level and state-level fixed e↵ects,
respectively. (Each regression table begins with the same na¨ıve OLS regression, however.) As with
all models in this paper, I cluster standard errors by school district to account for heteroskedasticity.
5.1 District-Level Fixed E↵ects
Below in Table 4, all but the first model are estimated with district-level fixed e↵ects. I find
that implementation of a state policy prohibiting or restricting the use of seniority as a factor in
teacher layo↵ decisions increases, on average, the yearly growth of the graduation rate by about
0.3 percentage points. Results are relatively consistent across model specification. The estimated
e↵ect of policy ranges from 0.250 to 0.375 percentage points. Estimates of the policy indicator are
statistically significant at less than the 0.05 level. These estimates are also economically significant,
as the average yearly increase in the national graduation rate for public high school students from
2010-11 to 2015-16 was about 1 percentage point.
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Table 4: Coe cient estimates for graduation rate changes, with district-level fixed e↵ects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS District FE District FE District FE District FE
Policy 0.253⇤⇤⇤ 0.250⇤⇤ 0.375⇤⇤⇤ 0.282⇤ 0.271⇤
(0.0480) (0.0944) (0.111) (0.114) (0.117)
Surplus per 1,000 Students -0.0191
(0.0254)
% Special Education -5.353
(2.749)
% ELL 1.771
(3.897)
% Poverty 3.349
(1.727)
Political Party Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Dummies No No No Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls No No No Yes Yes
N 27817 27817 27817 27768 26235
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Notes: Data spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, excluding data as noted in section 3.1. The
first model is estimated by regular OLS. All others include district-level fixed e↵ects. Policy is a variable
indicating whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting the influence of seniority on teacher layo↵
order in e↵ect in a given school year. Linear and quadratic terms are included for district membership and
cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by district.
If the yearly growth of overall U.S. graduation rates were 0.3 percentage points higher in the
five years between 2011-12 and 2015-16, it would have resulted in nearly 174,000 additional gradu-
ates. The estimate of 0.3 is within range of what Bekkerman and Gilpin (2011) find from a $1,000
per-teacher investment in improving teacher quality via o↵ering higher wages (0.2 to 1.1 percentage
point increase in the graduation rate). These results suggest that, absent using seniority to deter-
mine a layo↵ order, considerations such as teacher quality may play a larger role. The teachers
remaining following layo↵s not based on seniority may be more e↵ective and therefore their schools
would experience higher graduation rates, as opposed to schools that used seniority to determine
the layo↵ order. Another possible consideration is how individual school sta ng is a↵ected. If
some schools in a district already have high teacher turnover, then much of their sta↵ will have
little seniority. So if districts can prevent disproportionate layo↵s at schools that already have high
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turnover, it may have a positive e↵ect on graduation rates overall.
When the district-level controls are added, the precision of the estimated e↵ect of policy is
reduced. This is expected, as the within-variation of these factors is low. It is possible that these
variables should be treated as static. Under model 3, all are treated as static and the estimated
e↵ect of policy is 0.375 percentage points with a 95% confidence interval of 0.159 to 0.592. Model
4 is a compromise that allows membership/cohort controls as well as urbanicity to be dynamic. In
this case, the estimated e↵ect of policy is 0.282 with a 95% confidence interval of 0.059 to 0.505.
Conducting an F-test on model 5, the null hypothesis that the four variables with least variability
over time (surplus; special education, ELL, and poverty percentages) are jointly insignificant cannot
be rejected at the 5% level.
A final comment on the above results is that the measure of district financial health (surplus
per 1,000 students) appears to be insignificant and has little e↵ect on the estimated e↵ect of state
policy. It is possible that this metric for describing financial health is not sophisticated enough for
the model to identify any relationship between other variables. Public school funding streams are
indeed complex; grants can be earmarked for specific expenditures and so the flexibility for spending
on teacher salaries can di↵er between two districts with identical fiscal surpluses. Investigating
whether more complex definitions of fiscal health leads to di↵erent findings would be an avenue of
future research on this topic.
5.2 State-Level Fixed E↵ects
Allowing only state-level fixed e↵ects, I find estimated e↵ects of policy similar to those found under
models with district-level fixed e↵ects. Coe cient estimates on the policy variable range from
0.253 to 0.405 percentage points; all are statistically significant at less than the 0.001 level. Using
state-level fixed e↵ects is a stronger restriction: district-level variables specifically included in the
model provide the only dimension in which trendlines of districts in a given state can vary from one
another. However, the fact that the estimated e↵ect of policy is fairly similar whether district-level
variables are included or excluded suggests that they make little di↵erence. When omitted, any
possible bias appears to be minimal; the state-level factors that more strongly correlate with the
policy variable are more important.
Restricting Seniority as a Factor in Teacher Layo↵s 18
Table 5: Coe cient estimates for graduation rate changes, with state-level fixed e↵ects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS State FE State FE State FE State FE
Policy 0.253⇤⇤⇤ 0.277⇤⇤⇤ 0.388⇤⇤⇤ 0.405⇤⇤⇤ 0.382⇤⇤⇤
(0.0480) (0.0814) (0.0965) (0.0970) (0.0986)
Surplus per 1,000 Students 0.000628
(0.0196)
% Special Education -1.690
(1.022)
% ELL 1.385⇤
(0.540)
% Poverty 3.343⇤⇤⇤
(0.413)
State Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Party Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Dummies No No No Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls No No No Yes Yes
N 27817 27817 27817 27768 26235
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Notes: Data spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, excluding data as noted in section 3.1. The first
model is estimated by regular OLS. All others, with state dummy variables, are e↵ectively estimated with
state-level fixed e↵ects. Policy is a variable indicating whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting
the influence of seniority on teacher layo↵ order in e↵ect in a given school year. Linear and quadratic terms
are included for both student membership and cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by district.
In model 5 above, two variables (the percentage of students who are English language learners
and the percentage of children aged 5-17 in poverty within district boundaries) are now individually
statistically significant.12 Forcing these variables to be static via regressing policy on time-averaged
district-level variables produces only a marginal di↵erence to results.13 This supports treating
district-level variables as static.
12The only statistically significant estimates that do not have the signs I expected are the percentage of children in
poverty within the school district boundaries and the percentage of English language learners at the district. Districts
with more English language learners may also have higher rates of poverty. Students with higher academic ability
in areas with lower poverty may have a greater selection of alternatives to public school districts and select out of
public education. This would contribute to lower graduation rates for public school districts where the poverty level
is low. Students in high-poverty areas may have no alternate options, whether or not they are more able. The model
would then find a positive relationship between the poverty rate and public school graduation rate.
13The estimated e↵ect of the policy variable is 0.390 percentage points when utilizing time-averaged district-level
variables versus 0.382 percentage points when allowed to be dynamic (see model 5 in Table 5). Both estimates are
statistically significant at less than the 0.001 level.
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One last note on regression results in Table 5 is that, unlike with models estimated with district-
level fixed e↵ects, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the errors are autocorrelated. Autocor-
relation of the errors does not lead to bias of the coe cient estimates, but does invalidate the test
statistics including reported standard errors. Generally, the concern is that standard errors would
be larger and invalidate the statistical significance. Not only would the standard errors need to be
much larger in this case (as reported standard errors are substantially small), but also it is possible
that an autocorrelation correction would lead to even smaller standard errors since the correlation
between residuals over time is negative. Future work could more directly investigate the possible
impact of autocorrelation with state-level fixed e↵ects models.
6. Robustness Checks
6.1 Addressing Data Exclusions
In section 3.1, I discussed excluding from analysis any data on school districts with certain charac-
teristics. Now, I want to look at how results may have been a↵ected by the decision to exclude, in
particular, the following: district-level cohort sizes of less than or equal to 100, standard deviations
(of the change in graduation rate) greater than or equal to 30 percentage points, and/or charter
schools as part of the district in any year. While I provide reasons it is important to have these
exclusions, results are not fully dependent upon them. In Table 6 below, results without such
exclusions show the estimated e↵ects of state policy are consistently higher but not substantially
so. The models are identical to those in Table 4 (which utilizes district-level fixed e↵ects in all but
the first model).
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Table 6: Coe cient estimates for graduation rate changes, without data exclusions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS District FE District FE District FE District FE
Policy 0.337⇤⇤⇤ 0.267⇤ 0.449⇤⇤ 0.360⇤ 0.353⇤
(0.0627) (0.121) (0.139) (0.145) (0.150)
Surplus per 1,000 Students -0.0234
(0.0308)
% Special Education -0.676
(5.668)
% ELL 3.062
(5.587)
% Poverty 9.822⇤⇤⇤
(2.420)
Political Party Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Dummies No No No Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls No No No Yes Yes
N 44117 44117 44109 44060 40766
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Notes: Data spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16; see section 3.1 for initial exclusions. The first model
is estimated by regular OLS. All others include district-level fixed e↵ects. Policy is a variable indicating
whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting the influence of seniority on teacher layo↵ order in
e↵ect in a given school year. Linear and quadratic terms are included for both student membership and
cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by district.
6.2 Adding Weights
District-level observations of graduation rates are ultimately averages over individual student grad-
uation outcomes (a binary variable denoting if graduated). It is probable, then, that the variance
of errors is correlated with cohort size. With smaller cohort sizes, a single student’s outcome has
a higher impact on the district’s graduation rate. Therefore, I might expect higher variance in the
error with smaller cohort sizes. Consider then, this form of heteroskedasticity:
V ar("dt|cohortdt) =  
2
cohortdt
(2)
In addition to continuing to cluster standard errors by district, in Table 7 below I now add
cohort size as weights. Estimates of the e↵ect of policy are a little higher and still (marginally)
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statistically significant. The district-level fixed e↵ects regressions use a time-averaged cohort size
for the weight (cohortd). It is not unreasonable to use a time-averaged weight: across school years
considered, cohort size varies by less than 20%, 95% of the time. The regression with only state-level
dummies is not averaged (though results are similar with the time-averaged weight).
Table 7: Coe cient estimates for graduation rate changes, with weights=cohort size.
(1) (2) (3)
District FE District FE State FE
Policy 0.453⇤ 0.322⇤ 0.456⇤
(0.185) (0.160) (0.186)
Surplus per 1,000 Students -0.0604 -0.0311
(0.0341) (0.0265)
% Special Education -0.852 -2.162⇤
(3.539) (1.004)
% ELL -0.766 0.797
(3.728) (0.538)
% Poverty 2.425 4.035⇤⇤⇤
(2.442) (0.474)
State Dummies No No Yes
Political Party Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Urbanicity Dummies No Yes Yes
Membership/Cohort Controls No Yes Yes
N 27817 26235 26235
Standard errors in parentheses
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
Notes: Data spans school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, excluding data as noted in section 3.1. The first
two models allow for district-level fixed e↵ects and are weighted by the time-averaged cohort size. The third
model allows only state-level fixed e↵ects and is weighted by cohort size (not averaged over time). Policy is
a variable indicating whether a state has legislation prohibiting or restricting the influence of seniority on
teacher layo↵ order in e↵ect in a given school year. Linear and quadratic terms are included for both student
membership and cohort size. Standard errors are clustered by district.
Note that models 1 and 3 in Table 7 display near-identical results for the policy variable. Again,
the district-level fixed-e↵ects model omitting the district-level factors that lightly vary over time
is consistent with the full model using state-level fixed e↵ects. This suggests that the district-
level variables included with the state-level fixed e↵ects model may substantially describe the
time-invariant factors at the district level. (In fact, replicating the third model using time-averaged
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values of these variables leads to similar results: that this policy adds an estimated 0.446 percentage
points to yearly graduation rate increases, significant at less than the 0.01 level.) However, even
when assuming these variables as dynamic under the district-level fixed e↵ects model, the estimated
e↵ect of policy is still marginally significant.
7. Conclusion
Many states have since 2009 passed legislation prohibiting or restricting teacher seniority as a factor
in public school layo↵s. Overall, results in this paper show a positive, persistent e↵ect of this policy
on graduation rates. It considers data for school years 2006-07 through 2015-16, and accounts
for such state legislation changes during this time period. This result is consistent across model
specification. I find that this policy on average increases the yearly growth of the graduation rate
by about 0.3 percentage points, all else held equal.
These estimates overlap with the range of what Bekkerman and Gilpin (2011) find from a
$1,000 per-teacher investment in improving teacher quality via o↵ering higher wages (a 0.2 to 1.1
percentage point increase in the graduation rate). The estimates I find are economically significant,
as the average yearly increase in the national graduation rate for public high school students from
2010-11 to 2015-16 was about 1 percentage point. If the yearly growth of overall U.S. graduation
rates were 0.3 percentage points higher in the five years between 2011-12 and 2015-16, it would
have resulted in nearly 174,000 additional graduates. Estimates of the policy indicator variable,
under each model specification analyzed, are also statistically significant at less than the 0.05 level,
and less than 0.001 under many specifications. These results suggest that, absent using seniority to
determine a layo↵ order, considerations such as teacher quality may play a larger role. The teachers
remaining following layo↵s not based on seniority may be more e↵ective and therefore their schools
would experience higher graduation rates, as opposed to schools that used seniority to determine
the layo↵ order.
However, as Boyd et al. (2011) notes, the exact makeup of factors considered is important: the
distribution of importance placed on factors such as principal evaluations, teacher quality (VAM)
and teacher credentials may still impact the layo↵ order or result in unintended consequences for
student outcomes. For example, the labor market for teachers may respond di↵erently to how
a state or district determines layo↵ orders. A compelling analysis in Rothstein (2015) reinforces
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the concern for how the act of implementing something like VAM for hiring or retention can have
significant consequences on the labor market. It is optimistic that the benefits to students and
society can outweigh the costs (such as o↵ering higher pay since the job is now more risky), but
suspects that other research has overstated the net gains. Furthermore, greater importance placed
on value-added measures could result in more teachers “teaching to the test” and not necessarily
improving student outcomes beyond test scores. Hanushek and Rivkin (2012) note that how to
optimally quantify the characteristics that exhibit changes in a teacher’s e↵ectiveness is unknown,
so I would expect a large degree of subjectivity and possible incentive distortion.
Districts continue to experience mass layo↵s and debate what the optimal policy is. It has not
only been a contentious topic among legislatures; the issue has been brought to and continues in
state courts as well. The initial analysis in this paper suggests that the e↵ects may be significant
enough to warrant this debate.
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Appendix
Table 8: School year in which policy restricting seniority is first in e↵ect.
School Year States with Policy Restricting Seniority in Teacher Layo↵ Decisions (First Year in E↵ect)
2006-07 Texas, Missouri (see note)
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10 Arizona, Rhode Island
2010-11
2011-12 Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin
2012-13 Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Oklahoma
2013-14 Virginia
2014-15
2015-16 Washington
Notes: Texas and Missouri both had such policy prior to 2006-07.
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